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Implications of the Clean Air Act Amendments for the 
Northeast 
Maine Policy Review (1993). Volume 2, Number 2 
The Clean Air Acts Amendments (CAA) of 1990 continue to affect public policy at the federal, 
state and local levels of government. At the PURE ’93 Conference last January, "Alternatives to 
Traditional Regulation," one panel explored the implications of the CAA on the Northeast. 
Joseph A. Belanger of the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection provided this 
assessment of Title 1 of the CAA, particularly with respect to ozone attainment requirements. 
by Joseph Belanger 
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection 
Introduction 
Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 concerns attainment and maintenance of 
national ambient air quality standards. In the Northeast, the major attainment issue is to meet the 
ozone standards. Within the ozone attainment issue, there are five central points about the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990 that should be addressed: 
• What ozone "attainment" is, and what it means for the Northeast. 
• The controls that will be required for utilities, particularly with regard to nitrogen oxides 
(NOx).  
• The scientific implications of NOx controls and attainment, and how these shape the 
problem in most of the Northeast, and to some extent in Maine. 
• What some of the states and the Ozone Transport Commission, which covers the eleven 
northeastern states, a portion of Virginia and the District of Columbia, are doing. 
• The issues that are raised by market- based incentives, such as trading of NOx offsets. 
The ozone situation in the Northeast 
There are four ozone non-attainment classifications within the New England region, which vary 
from severe in southwest Connecticut to marginal in parts of New Hampshire and Maine. The 
target dates for ozone attainment range from 2007 in the severe areas to 1993 for the marginal 
ones. Inasmuch as ozone is a problem that, to a large degree, results from transported pollutants, 
the ability of states such as Maine to reach attainment by the earlier dates, while states such as 
Connecticut and Massachusetts are on extended timetables, could be questioned. 
Part of Maine is in the lowest NOx classification area, so it has until 1993 to attain ozone 
compliance. Southwest Connecticut has until 2007, and the excellent pollutants from 
Connecticut will be traveling up the coast and over Massachusetts and Maine. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical summary of the non-attainment status of all areas in the Northeast. 
As you can see, the most severe problems occur in a region that extends from New Jersey to 
southwest Connecticut. Most of southern New England is in the "moderate" category. The 
southwestern tip of Maine is in the "moderate" category, while much of the central coastal region 
is in the "marginal" category. 
Figure 1: Areas Designated as not Meeting the National Ambient Air Quality Standard 
(NAAQS) for Ozone 
 
Title I NOx provisions and utilities 
Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments has many provisions relating to specific emission 
reductions requirements, control of emissions growth and attainment planning. Three regulatory 
strictures arise from the treatment of oxides of nitrogen as an ozone non-attainment pollutant. 
These are: 
• A requirement that any new major stationary source of NOx create or procure emission 
reductions that offset its new emissions in an amount greater than 1 to 1. These are 
generally referred to as offsets. 
• A requirement that existing major sources of NOx install "reasonably available control 
technology"(RACT). 
• The implicit requirement that NOx emissions be reduced below the RACT levels as a part 
of the strategy for reaching attainment. 
Each of these requirements provides utilities and their regulators both with challenges and with 
opportunities. For example, the offset requirement, which essentially establishes a cap on the 
level of total emissions from large sources, will require any newly-permitted power supply, 
whether an independent power producer or a utility-owned facility, to acquire emissions 
reductions or credits at least 1.15 times its total NOx emissions. These credits may be difficult to 
find, and they will also represent a cost in addition to the cost of the higher level of controls that 
are required by the Clean Air Act Amendments. But this requirement is also an opportunity, 
because sources other than power plants will be required to obtain offsets. Existing power plants 
that have a large potential to reduce emissions may be a source of the emission credits for major 
new industrial plants, if the appropriate mechanisms and incentives are established. 
The RACT requirements probably provide significant challenges because the general 
requirement is that existing sources reduce NOx emissions levels by approximately 40 percent by 
1995. Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) has developed 
proposed emissions limits for various types of utility plants and each of the states is adopting its 
own regulations to implement the program. 
EPA’s ozone studies 
NOx regulation will also affect utilities in the second stage of NOx control. There has been no 
consensus on the role that NOx plays in the ozone problem, and therefore no agreement on the 
extent to which it needs to be controlled. The EPA, along with the Ozone Transport Commission, 
is trying to determine what level of NOx reductions, as compared to volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs) reductions, will be required. Efforts to reduce VOCs would fall largely on some 
industrial applications and would affect the motor vehicle sector. But the utility sector would 
largely escape, because utilities are not big VOC emitters. 
Three sets of studies have been done on the role of NOx in ozone by the Environmental 
Protection Agency. First, the EPA examined the Clean Air Act requirements to determine if 
controls should extend to Ohio and the West. EPA modeled this extension, and discovered that it 
did not help. EPA then looked at various across-the-board percentage reductions in the 
Northeast. This was really a sensitivity analysis to determine where we should apply controls. 
This approach has started to give some direction. Elimination of a lot of volatile organic 
compounds -- gasoline vapors and car pollutants and the emissions from industrial coating 
operations, such as paint -- does not seem to make much difference. These reductions did not 
significantly improve the situation in the Northeast. On the other hand, if the focus of control is 
on NOx, then there is a very significant improvement. This study was very wide-scale and 
several caveats need to be placed on interpretation of these model results. The models are very 
gross and need refining. But they point to the need for NOx, rather than VOC, controls. The 
implication is that controls are required for those who burn a lot of fuel and for motor vehicles, 
because these are the two major sources of NOx. 
But even when all of these controls that are required under the Clean Air Act Amendments are 
implemented -- the car programs, the industrial controls, and the RACT requirements -- 
problems still exist in southern Maine. Violations of the standard could occur even after 
implementing all that is required by the Amendments. More restrictive controls would probably 
be necessary. Roughly a 75 percent emission reduction in NOx uniformly across all sources 
would bring much of the region into attainment and would solve the problems in southern Maine. 
However, controls in the areas of the Northeast states that already meet ozone standards have no 
effect. This would suggest a focus on just the non-attaining northeast corridor to determine if 
essentially the same results can be achieved by controls focused on the non-attainment areas 
rather than a 75 percent reduction across the board. This focused analysis tends to direct attention 
toward the electric utility sector, which is the major source of NOx in the Northeast. In Maine, 
some big industries, such as paper companies, will bear some of the burden of compliance. 
Market mechanisms and the Ozone Transport Commission 
Given these various demands, the challenge is to provide mechanisms that allow the necessary 
reductions to be made in the most cost-effective manner and to assure that a new or expanding 
industry or business is able to find the necessary credits. The Clean Air Act Amendments 
encourage the use of market mechanisms to achieve these objectives. 
There are rules in the Clean Air Act about when and how trades to offset emissions can occur. 
Basically, emissions from an area with a more severe air pollution problem can be traded for use 
in a less severe area. The air quality standard in the area in which it is used cannot be violated as 
result of that trade. And a trade requires more than a one to one offset. In a worse case (or the 
best, from the perspective of environmentalists), the ratio is 1.3 to 1.0. A firm that needs one 
hundred tons of emission rights would have to find 130 tons of emissions reduction somewhere 
else. 
Emissions trading programs are being encouraged at the state level. Emissions trading is virtually 
impossible if each potential buyer must find potential sellers on an ad hoc basis. The transaction 
costs would be very high, and there would be difficulty in planning projects when it is unknown 
from where emissions will come. Without a market, there would be no incentives to create 
emission reductions in advance and to put them "in the bank." At the state level, there is an effort 
to establish a formalized trading program. Firms will have the opportunity as they implement the 
first (1995) stage of RACT to implement more efficient control devices than are necessary to 
achieve RACT. Such firms can put those savings in the bank for later use, or the firms can sell 
those savings to someone else. We are trying to develop that kind of market across all of the 
states, with help from the Ozone Transport Commission, so that interstate trading of credits may 
be possible. 
The Ozone Transport Commission is very interested in the possibility of an emission credit 
trading program. Its goal is an interstate program that would allow the various states in the 
region (from northern Virginia through Maine) to trade NOx emission credits. This interest arises 
in part from the offset requirements that apply to all areas of the ozone transport region, 
attainment areas or not. Note that this differs from elsewhere in the country where attainment 
areas are exempt from offsets. And in part, the interest arises from the idea that a larger trading 
domain will result in a more robust market, lower costs, and an increased regional economic 
competitiveness. Of particular concern are the portions of states or entire states that are classified 
as attainment areas and that have limited existing sources from which to obtain credits and face 
constraints on future development. States like Vermont have very few sources of these credits for 
a new industry that might try to locate there. 
In addition to the issues raised by any trading program, such as environmental integrity, 
workability, and compatibility with federal and state regulation, interstate trading raises 
questions about the interstate economic effects of trading programs. Because of the legal, 
technical, and political complexities, the Ozone Transport Commission approach is cautious. It 
focuses on promoting state programs, on identifying those elements of state programs that need 
to be identical or similar to ensure compatibility, and on identifying the geo-graphic areas within 
which trading could take place given legal constraints and environmental and meteorological 
realities. 
Implications for utilities and regulators 
None of these changes, of course, is without implications for utility regulators and utilities. 
Because utilities are a major source of NOx, they are prime candidates for offsets for new 
development. They are also prime candidates for the use of credits to comply efficiently with 
NOx RACT requirements, as when the scheduling of some of the necessary retrofits is best 
extended beyond the regulatory compliance date. The trading of credits might be used when 
compliance costs would otherwise be unreasonable because the remaining useful life of a facility 
would not justify the investment in control equipment. Averaging, or "bubbling," on a plant-
wide, utility-wide or area-wide basis would be another way in which a trading system could 
result in lower costs. This is especially true in the context of long-range attainment plans, where 
the states have more flexibility in the approach they take. 
The offset requirements and trading programs also raise a number of interesting questions for 
regulators, such as: How should the value of these credits be viewed when dealing with avoided 
cost determinations, demand-side management programs, and rate-making? The value of these 
credits may be $2,000 to $5,000 per ton initially. As emissions are further curtailed, these values 
will go much higher. What should electric utilities be expected to do to provide emission credits 
to facilitate economic development in a state? Should they be required to incur greater NOx 
reduction costs to provide credits that promote economic growth in their service area? Should 
utilities be required to sell credits on preferential terms to firms within their service territory? 
And most obviously, how will sales and purchases of credits be viewed in the context of reviews 
of prudency of business decisions? 
Conclusions 
Given all these questions and problems, why should we pursue market approaches? Quite 
simply, we have no alternative. The offsets are required for economic growth. Attainment of 
clean air objectives is both desirable and necessary. Economists indicate that savings of 20 to 40 
percent of compliance costs may be possible under a market-based program. The savings occur 
because reductions can be implemented where and at a time that are most cost effective. As firms 
are subjected to second stage requirements, both the costs and potential savings become even 
larger. In Connecticut, costs are estimated to be between $700 million and $1 billion per year to 
reach attainment of the Clean Air Act Amendments objectives. When the annual savings are 
summed over a 14-year time horizon, the total dollars at stake are very large. We really have no 
choice but to seek cost-effective strategies. 
Joseph A. Belanger is director of Planning and Standards in the Connecticut Department of 
Environmental Protection’s Bureau of Air Management. He is currently involved with the Ozone 
Transport Commission, recently having been named chair of its Stationary and Area Source 
Committee. 
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